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Americans are living through and participating 
in an era of historic political division.1 As one 
reporter recently put it: “Polarization, building for 
decades, was already intense before COVID-19. 
Now it’s on steroids.”2 
The signs are everywhere – from mass 
demonstrations and protests in support of 
Black Lives Matter3 to the politicization of mask-
wearing4 and other seemingly commonsense 
measures to curb the coronavirus pandemic.5 The 
latter of these divisions is being fueled in part by 
“divergent cues” from “political elites” in the two 
major political parties.6 This lack of a concerted, 
bipartisan response is seriously undermining 
efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19, with 
deadly consequences.7
If these observations are not enough to convince 
readers of just how far apart politically Americans 
have grown, then consider one of the most 
widely used numerical indicators of polarization: 
the partisan gap in Presidential job approval 
ratings.8 This long-running measure, which has 
been tracked since at least 1945,9 has been on 
an upward trajectory for decades.10 Prior to the 
current Presidential administration, the metric 
topped out at 77 points for the 2016 calendar 
year.11 During that year, 89% of Democrats 
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approved of President Obama’s job performance 
compared to 12% of Republicans. Since that time, 
the gap has widened even further. The overall gap 
for the 2019 calendar year hit 79 points, with 87% 
of Republicans approving of President Trump’s job 
performance compared to just 8% of Democrats. 
Early data suggest that 2020 will be another 
year for the record books. As of this writing, the 
partisan gap in Presidential approval has been at 
or above 80 points in seven of the ten two-week 
periods for which data are available. During the 
remaining three survey periods, the figure stood 
at 78 points twice and 79 points once.12 The 
spread has been as high as 87 points – during 
consecutive reporting periods from mid-January 
to mid-February – and has averaged around 83 
points since the start of 2020. Data from the most 
recent two-week period (ending 4 June 2020) 
show that 85% of Republicans currently approve 
of President Trump’s job performance compared 
to just 5% of Democrats.13
On the backdrop of civil unrest and the nation’s 
politically discordant handling of COVID-19, these 
alarming figures bode poorly for the prospects of 
overcoming partisan gridlock to pass progressive, 
High Road legislation.14 At face value, members 
of opposing political parties seem too unwilling to 
Economic Development on Common Ground:
Two Bipartisan State Policies for Defunding Low Road Infrastructure
1
HIGH ROAD POLICY
2cede any ground to their rivals to come together to 
enact meaningful change. To be sure, lawmaking 
bodies are even unable to agree that a global 
pandemic, which has thus far killed over 125,000 
Americans and left tens of millions jobless, 
demands additional government intervention.15 
Nevertheless, there is at least one domain where 
the two sides of the political divide appear to 
share common ground. Organizations and 
authors from right-leaning free market think tanks 
like the Mercatus Center16 to the left-leaning 
Good Jobs First17 have made the case to end 
targeted economic development subsidies and 
tax incentives.18,19 The next section explores the 
rationale for this position. From there, the memo 
highlights two opportunities to reform – and 
ultimately phase out – economic development 
incentives in New York State. Both opportunities 
were introduced to the New York State Assembly 
in the 2019-20 legislative session. Thus, the 
legislation already exists and does not need to 
be drafted anew. The bills are available to be 
reported out of committee and put to a vote (or, 
since the session has ended, reintroduced in 
2020-21 and then reported out of committee for 
a full Chamber vote). They accordingly represent 
near- to medium-term actions that the State 
legislature can take to wind down and then end a 
practice that, as detailed below, is roundly derided 
across the political spectrum. Finally, the memo 
concludes with an even more immediate policy 
target: a federal COVID-19 relief package for state 
and local governments that might help end the 
“interstate economic development arms race.”20
Bipartisan Consensus on Economic 
Development Incentives
While the ultimate reasons that representatives 
from the right and the left both want to do away 
with development incentives might diverge (e.g., 
market distortion21 versus subsidized inequality22), 
their proximate justifications are essentially 
identical. Both sides have raised the following 
points:
•  peer-reviewed research broadly agrees 
that “while subsidies may benefit the firms, 
activities, industries, or regions that [those 
subsidies] privilege, most are not associated 
with measurable improvements in the broader 
communities that pay for them”;23
•  incentives are almost never decisive factors 
in employers’ location decisions – meaning 
that most incentives are not needed to lure 
employers, and are therefore wasteful;24
•  the very existence of incentives encourages 
firms to spend resources on lobbying and 
procuring incentives – these investments 
could otherwise be reinvested in businesses 
and workers, as opposed to enriching already 
wealthy companies and their shareholders;25
•  because incentives are paid for with public 
resources, they often lead to higher taxes, 
reduced public services, or both, in the 
jurisdictions where they are provided;26
•  for all of the above reasons, providing targeted 
economic development incentives is a Low Road 
practice that leads to and reinforces spatial and 
economic inequality;27
•  and, perhaps most notably, scores of elected 
officials and decision-makers decry the 
practice and would prefer to eliminate the use 
of incentives;28 however, they feel pressured 
to continue playing the game for fear of 
putting themselves and their jurisdictions at a 
strategic disadvantage in the global economic 
development marketplace.29
It is beyond the scope of this memo to unpack 
the research on which the preceding conclusions 
are based, nor is it our aim to relitigate specific 
findings or pieces of evidence from that 
body of work.30 Instead, we note only that the 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON COMMON GROUND
3instructive literature points to at least two general 
problems with status quo economic development 
incentive policies: (1) incentives subsidize 
private companies and shareholders with public 
resources, at a net cost to the public; and (2) 
there is no mechanism for coordinating economic 
development policy across jurisdictions to prevent 
this outcome from happening. 
With respect to the latter, even a slight suspicion 
that a “rival” jurisdiction might offer development 
incentives causes all other jurisdictions to do the 
same. This absence of mutual assurance makes 
all jurisdictions worse off by pushing them deeper 
into an “economic development arms race” from 
which they see “unilateral disarmament” as a 
losing strategy.31
Logic suggests that the former of these problems 
would disappear if the latter were wholly resolved 
– that is, if jurisdictions mutually agreed to 
eliminate development incentives. Assuming 
that such an agreement could be reached – and 
assuming that jurisdictions would face sanctions 
that cost them more than the perceived benefits 
associated with defecting from the agreement 
– there would be no incentives to speak of, and, 
hence, no net cost imposed on the public. 
Unfortunately, this type of complex, multilateral 
arrangement is probably not something that 
can be accomplished in the near- to medium-
term, given all the parties and transaction costs 
involved (though, as expanded on in the final 
section below, COVID-19 may change that reality). 
As such, for any given state or locality wishing to 
withdraw from the arms race, the more expedient 
path is arguably to solve the first problem first, 
while laying the groundwork to gradually build a 
solution to the second one over time. New York 
State is positioned to provide national leadership 
on both matters, by (1) passing the Economic 
Transparency and Accountability Act (NYS Bill 
A07096) and (2) adopting the Interstate Compact 
Agreement to Phase Out Corporate Giveaways 
(NYS Bill A08675/S3061). The remainder of this 
memo examines the key provisions included in 
these two legislative proposals.
Opportunity 1: Pass the Economic 
Transparency and Accountability Act
The Economic Transparency and Accountability 
Act (“ETA”) was introduced to the New York State 
Legislature in the 2019-20 session by Assembly 
Member Ron Kim (D-40). The ETA is a far-reaching 
economic development law that would, among 
other things: 
•  substantially reduce the total amount of 
incentives provided by any granting agency on a 
per employer basis; 
•  contractually obligate incentive recipients to 
create new, full-time, quality jobs; 
•  contractually obligate incentive recipients to 
reserve a minimum percentage of new full-time 
jobs for persons from low-income geographies 
and vulnerable population groups; 
•  require incentive recipients to provide periodic, 
consistently formatted, comprehensive 
disclosure reports to granting agencies – 
recipients that fail to provide these reports on 
time are subject to daily monetary fines that 
increase in value after 20 days past the deadline;
•  require all property-taxing entities to aggregate 
reports from incentive recipients in their 
respective jurisdictions into comprehensive, 
consistently formatted, periodic reports that are 
published and conspicuously advertised on those 
entities’ (e.g., cities, towns, villages) websites – 
state funding can be withheld from jurisdictions 
that fail to comply with these deadlines and 
responsibilities;
•  recapture incentive monies from recipients that 
fail to meet the job creation, job quality, and/or 
job perpetuity standards set forth in the ETA (see 
especially Sections 456-459 of the bill).32
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reforms33 and strategic imperatives34 for shifting 
status quo, Low Road economic development 
incentive policies toward the High Road. 
Specifically, the ETA:
Imposes strict subsidy caps. Subsidy caps are 
limits, or maximum dollar figures, placed on the 
incentives that any one granting agency may 
offer to a private entity for any one development 
project. Caps can be tied to a project’s total cost 
or to the number of qualifying jobs the project is 
expected to create.35 The ETA employs the latter 
mechanism, specifying that no granting agency 
shall provide more than $6,000 in incentives per 
qualifying job. In practice, subsidy caps commonly 
range from $5,000 to $35,000 per qualifying job.36 
The ETA would therefore place New York State 
at the low end of the spectrum – and thus a step 
closer to phasing out giveaways altogether. The 
strict cap would be a major shift from existing 
policy. Consider that, prior to breaking down, the 
deal to bring Amazon’s HQ2 to New York City 
amounted to more than $112,000 in incentives per 
job.37 
Requires disclosure of incentives and recipient 
compliance. Disclosure refers to the regular 
“reporting of public costs (subsidies received) 
and public benefits (jobs created, wages, etc.) 
relating to economic development deals.”38 For 
disclosure to be effective, it must (i) be transparent 
and accessible, (ii) cover all granting agencies, (iii) 
apply to all development incentives and be deal- 
and company-specific, and (iv) be continuous. 
The ETA satisfies these provisions. It mandates 
that all incentive recipients provide annual, 
detailed reports on job creation, job quality, worker 
benefits, and other public benefits. And it requires 
that all property-taxing jurisdictions (e.g., cities, 
towns, villages) compile and publish detailed 
annual reports on incentive activity and corporate 
compliance with ETA standards. The Act further 
makes progressive process reforms39 to increase 
public awareness about prospective incentive 
packages and provide opportunities for public 
participation in decision-making.
Creates clawbacks. A clawback “is a clause of a 
subsidy law or contract that…says…a company 
must uphold its end of the bargain or else 
taxpayers have some money-back protection.”40 
In other words, if the incentive recipient does not 
deliver on the conditions set forth by the ETA, 
then the granting agency is entitled to reclaim, or 
recapture, a monetary sum up to the dollar value of 
the incentives. 
Contractually obligates incentive recipients to 
create quality jobs. As the text that introduced the 
ETA to the New York State Assembly reads: “’Any 
job is a good job’ is no longer a sufficient rationale 
for corporate subsidies.”41 Job quality standards 
are “requirements that subsidized companies 
create jobs that meet certain criteria, including 
wage levels, availability of health insurance, and 
full-time hours.”42 Among the job quality standards 
imposed by the ETA are: (i) full-time employees 
must be paid statewide, industry-standard 
wages, verified against Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and Bureau of Economic Analysis data; (ii) full-
time employees must provide health benefits 
that cover at least half the cost of employees’ 
insurance premiums; (iii) full-time employees 
must be guaranteed an average of 35 hours of 
work per week per calendar year; (iv) all full-time 
employees must receive at least twelve days paid 
leave per year; (v) at least 30% of full-time workers 
must live in a relatively low income geography; 
and (vi) at least 10% of full-time workers must 
come from certain marginalized populations (see 
Section 457.7 for a full enumeration of qualifying 
subpopulations). Stated more plainly, the ETA 
requires subsidy recipients to create full-time jobs 
that pay decent wages and offer essential benefits 
– and it specifies that a meaningful fraction 
of those jobs must be filled by workers from 
geographies and population subgroups that have 
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economy.43
Creates a State “carrot” for local governments 
to judiciously monitor compliance. That is, under 
the ETA, property-taxing entities that do not follow 
reporting and disclosure requirements could 
potentially lose State funding. The ETA therefore 
provides a strong incentive for localities to “race to 
the top” by carefully monitoring and enforcing the 
terms and conditions of local incentive agreement 
with recipients.44
In combining these five elements, the ETA would 
fundamentally overhaul a system of economic 
development incentives that is condemned on 
both sides of the political aisle. The resulting 
system would be fairer, transparent, and more 
participatory; would create net public benefits or 
else recapture funds; and would motivate close 
monitoring and enforcement of its provisions by 
local property-taxing jurisdictions. It is therefore a 
commonsense bill that advances the public good. 
Still, there are at least two minor amendments 
that might make it even stronger.
First, legislators can strengthen the bill’s subsidy 
cap language to foreclose on a potential loophole. 
The bill presently states that “no granting body 
shall provide a development subsidy to a recipient 
corporation in excess of six thousand dollars for 
each new full-time job created by the recipient 
corporation” (Sec. 452; emphasis added). The Act 
defines a granting body as “any agency, board, 
office, public-private partnership, public benefit 
corporation or authority of the state or a local 
government unit that provides a development 
subsidy” (Sec. 451.5). Taken together, these two 
provisions might allow for multiple granting bodies 
to legally provide the maximum allowable subsidy 
($6,000 per qualifying job) to the same private 
entity for the same development project, thereby 
circumventing the cap. Language to exclude these 
possibilities can be introduced to guarantee that 
the maximum subsidy for a single project from 
all granting bodies, combined, is set to $6,000 per 
qualifying job.
Second, legislators should consider amending 
the bill to add African Americans to its list of 
population subgroups for whom a fraction of 
quality, full-time jobs must be reserved. In its 
current form, the Act undeniably puts a stop 
to Low Road economic development subsidy 
practices and creates mechanisms to promote 
economic equality; but it does not explicitly 
engage with the ongoing fight for racial justice. 
Requiring that incentive recipients create quality 
jobs for African American residents could be an 
incremental step in that direction.
With or without these recommendations, 
reporting the ETA out of committee and getting 
it to the floor of both State houses seems like a 
reasonable priority for the upcoming legislative 
session. There is political consensus that targeted 
economic development incentives are wasteful 
and inequitable in their current form. The ETA 
offers strong remedies for these problems.
Opportunity 2: Adopt the Interstate 
Compact Agreement to Phase Out 
Corporate Giveaways
Recall that the research on targeted economic 
development incentives points to at least two 
big problems with the status quo: (1) incentives 
rarely net public benefits and typically only enrich 
wealthy corporations and shareholders;45 and 
(2) even though many public officials recognize 
this problem and disapprove of incentives,46 they 
fear that unilateral withdrawal from the subsidy 
game would put their jurisdictions at a strategic 
disadvantage relative to other regions.47
The Economic Transparency and Accountability 
Act (ETA) arguably offers solutions to the first 
problem for New York State – but what about the 
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when no granting agency is willing to be the first 
back down?
Authors in the economic development literature 
frequently frame this coordination failure as a 
prisoners’ dilemma (PD).48 The PD is a conceptual 
device for describing situations in which one or 
more parties face a choice between cooperating 
or acting selfishly. If all parties cooperate, then 
they are all better off. However, each individual 
party has an incentive to be selfish. In the classic 
formulation, two partners suspected of carrying 
out a crime face questioning in separate rooms. 
If both refuse to talk to investigators, then both 
receive a light punishment given a lack of more 
damning evidence against them. If both confess, 
then both receive a moderate sentence that is 
more severe than the punishment from when 
both remain silent, but less severe than the 
maximum sentence. If one suspect “talks” while 
the other remains silent, then the confessor goes 
free while the partner receives the maximum 
sentence. In such circumstances, regardless 
of what the other suspect does, each individual 
is better off confessing. More precisely, if one’s 
“rival” confesses, then remaining silent renders 
the maximum possible sentence. If one’s “rival” 
remains silent, then confessing renders no 
punishment at all, compared to a light sentence 
from also remaining silent. In short, both suspects 
reason that they should confess. And, in the end, 
both get a harsher sentence than they would 
receive if they cooperated or coordinated with one 
another to remain silent.49
Comparisons between the PD and the economic 
development incentive game are appealing, which 
is why some State legislators explicitly refer to 
economic subsidies as a “prisoners’ dilemma.”50 
However, if the research is right that public 
officials generally prefer not to offer development 
incentives,51 then the game is not really a PD. In a 
PD, participants always have an incentive to act 
selfishly, even when their “rivals” act cooperatively. 
In the economic development incentive game, 
public officials prefer to do what [they expect] 
their rivals to do. If they expect their counterparts 
to use subsidies, then they feel obliged to do the 
same, thus joining the “arms race.”52 But, if they 
expect their colleagues to cooperate, and forswear 
development incentives, then they prefer to do the 
same. Like the PD, this cooperative scenario yields 
the best outcome for all parties. Unlike the PD, 
though, parties are not competitors trying to win 
victories at each other’s expense. They are merely 
interactants hoping to coordinate their decisions. 
Consequently, the economic development policy 
game is not a PD, but something called a game of 
assurance.53
The distinction here is more than theoretical. 
Generally speaking, mechanisms to build trust 
and promote cooperation are costlier, riskier, and 
often less effective in a PD setting since each 
party has a unilateral incentive to act selfishly 
(and “win” a “victory” 54). By contrast, trust-building 
mechanisms are quite effective at promoting 
stable cooperation (meaning that parties face 
stronger incentives to cooperate than to defect) 
among participants in games of assurance.55 After 
all, participants in such games “win” when their 
decisions are coordinated. 
In the case of interstate economic development 
policy, one trust-building mechanism to promote 
coordination among subsidy granting bodies – 
and hence solve the coordination failure in the 
assurance game – is an interstate compact. 
An interstate compact is a contract “between 
two or more states creating an agreement on…
specific policy challenges [or] regulatory matters.” 
Compacts have been used in the U.S. since 
1789 and “let states develop a dynamic, self-
regulatory system that remains flexible enough to 
address changing needs.”56 
Interstate compacts are voluntary, but legally 
binding for all member states that enter into 
them. For that reason, a “compact allows states 
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and to be sure that their compact partners will be 
held to their own promises.”57 That is, compacts 
create mutual assurance that members will act 
cooperatively in a given domain. As such, writers 
from the left58 and right59 have argued that states 
should adopt a multilateral compact to phase out 
targeted economic development subsidies.
This proposal has taken off in recent years. 
Legislators from both parties, representing around 
one-third of states, have introduced bills to their 
respective chambers that call for an interstate 
compact “to phase out corporate tax giveaways.”60 
So far, the bill has passed the lower chamber 
in the Utah State Legislature, where it was 
introduced by a Republican Assembly Member; 
and it is gaining momentum in states across the 
country.61 
During the 2019-20 legislative session in New 
York, the interstate compact proposal was 
introduced to the lower chamber by Assembly 
Member Ron Kim (D-40) and to the upper 
chamber by State Senator Julia Salazar (D-18). To 
date, the bill has attracted six cosponsors in the 
Assembly and one in the Senate. Consistent with 
parallel proposals in other states, this “Act to…
[establish] an interstate compact agreement to 
phase out corporate giveaways” contains five core 
provisions:
A conceptually and geographically inclusive 
definition of corporate giveaway. The Act defines 
a giveaway as “any company-specific or industry-
specific disbursement of funds via property, cash 
or deferred or reduced tax liability by a state or 
local government to a particular company or 
industry.”62 This sweeping definition suggests that 
the agreement applies to all direct and indirect 
handouts in all jurisdictions that lie in participating 
states.
Voluntary membership that is open to all states. 
Multilateral agreements characterized by open 
and voluntary participation are conducive to 
consensus-building and cooperative governance.63 
Put another way, voluntary associations connect 
members that have at least some shared sense of 
a problem and some shared vision for a solution. 
As such, members are generally motivated to 
work cooperatively. More coercive arrangements 
can crowd out these positive motivations. 
Nevertheless, as expanded on in the final section 
below, coercive mechanisms may be useful when 
cooperation fails to emerge organically.
Explicit recognition of the Low Road nature of 
targeted economic development incentives. The 
bill states plainly that: (i) “Corporate giveaways are 
among the least effective uses of taxpayer dollars 
to create and maintain jobs”; and (ii) “Corporate 
giveaways fuel business inequality as only the 
largest businesses receive the vast majority of 
these funds.”64
Prohibitions against job poaching. Job poaching 
is the “use of subsidies to lure existing business 
facilities from one jurisdiction to another.”65 The 
Act to establish an anti-corporate giveaway 
compact expressly prohibits this practice for all 
member states. This anti-poaching provision is 
the actionable piece of the compact. The compact 
does not declare that member states will end the 
use of corporate giveaways – only that they will 
not provide giveaways that have the effect of luring 
a company from one member state to another. As 
the Act proclaims, anti-poaching is simply a “first 
step” toward phasing out giveaways altogether.
Democratic enforcement powers. While the Act 
states that the “chief law enforcement officer of 
each member state shall enforce [the] compact,” 
it gives every “taxpaying resident of any member 
state” explicit standing to use their state’s legal 
apparatus to compel “chief law enforcement 
officers” to enforce the compact.66 This subtle 
provision empowers residents and communities 
to challenge corporations and public subservience 
to corporations in a way that is scarcely possible 
under existing laws.67
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participatory democracy via mechanisms 
that, among other things, build and promote 
cooperation and solidarity.68 The Interstate 
Compact to Phase Out Corporate Giveaways is 
a tool to facilitate interstate cooperation on, and 
to provide democratic enforcement powers to 
residents who want to participate in the process 
of eliminating, economic development subsidies. 
The Compact is being championed in multiple 
states by lawmakers from both major parties. 
New York has an opportunity to be the first state 
– or among the first states – to enter into the 
bipartisan compact by passing Legislative Bill 
A08675/S3061 in both State houses. 
Next Step: Federal Pandemic Relief 
and Corporate Giveaways
Because the New York State legislature is out of 
session until January 2021, the two opportunities 
outlined above cannot be pursued immediately. 
What state lawmakers can do immediately is 
continue pressuring Congress to provide more 
pandemic relief for state and local governments. 
Researchers at the Economic Policy Institute 
estimate that without additional COVID-19 aid for 
state and local governments, more than 400,000 
New Yorkers will “likely lose their jobs by the end 
of 2021.”69 State legislators must therefore use 
their political capital to increase pressure for aid. 
Given the widespread, bipartisan opposition to 
corporate giveaways, one way that legislators 
might make the idea of more federal funding 
palatable to members of Congress is to 
suggest that aid be contingent on “contractually 
forswear[ing] future targeted economic 
development subsidies.”70 Mercatus Center 
researchers Michael Farren and John Mozena 
make a strong case for contingent COVID-19 relief 
by observing that such a stipulation falls within 
Congress’ scope of enumerated powers, and 
that it has several historical precedents.71 Among 
other examples, the promise of federal funding 
has been used to push states to raise their 
minimum drinking ages and to  “modernize their 
Unemployment Insurance programs.”72 
While there are moral reasons to reject a policy 
of contingent funding during a pandemic that 
is impacting every state and community in the 
nation, the reality is that additional state and 
local government aid has not been otherwise 
forthcoming.73 The U.S. Senate Majority Leader 
suggested on record that “bankruptcy, not more 
federal money, might be best for state and local 
governments.”74 He has, however, signaled that 
more aid is possible – so long as it comes with 
strings attached.75
If Congress will not provide necessary aid to 
state and local governments unless the funding 
serves some dual policy purpose, then it makes 
sense to target economic development incentives. 
Both parties want to see the Low Road practice 
come to an end. While an interstate compact to 
phase out subsidies is a major step up the High 
Road, not all states are likely to join. Refusal 
of some states to participate could undermine 
any compact that forms organically, due to the 
perception that economic development policy is 
an “arms race” from which voluntary withdrawal is 
a losing strategy. 
Federal intervention can diffuse this situation 
and create conditions for across-the-board 
disarmament. Rather than intervening in a 
coercive manner, the promise of funding provides 
a “carrot” for state and local governments that 
they can either opt into or decline. Of course, 
pandemic relief is not a standard carrot. It’s 
more like the only carrot in an otherwise empty 
produce section. Attaching strings to such 
funds is therefore like forcing some state and 
local governments to sign contracts under 
duress. Some might enter an interstate compact 
voluntarily. Others might not ordinarily agree to the 
terms.
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would be operating within the scope of its 
authority if it moves to offer federal COVID-19 
aid to state and local governments that agree to 
end targeted economic development incentives. 
As we just noted above, this use pandemic relief 
to advance a separate policy priority would be 
morally suspect. Nevertheless, if Congress will not 
provide urgently needed aid without employing it 
as a carrot for state and local policy change, then, 
at minimum, that policy change should involve a 
bipartisan step toward the High Road. State and 
local officials can use their political capital make 
this case to their colleages in Congress.
Eliminating corporate giveaways would critically 
weaken existing Low Road infrastructure 
by removing a known source of economic 
inequality.76 It would also represent a major 
bipartisan policy change in an era of intense 
political polarization. While Congress can take 
immediate action toward these ends, based on 
current levels of gridlock, such action seems 
unlikely. Thus, state and local governments must 
continue to lead the way. As this memo has 
argued, the New York State Legislature has two 
substantive opportunities to do just that.
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